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In this paper we study the evolution of the labor share in the OECD since 1970.
We show it is essentially related to the capital-output ratio; that this relationship
is shifted by factors like the price of imported materials or the skill mix; and that
discrepancies between the marginal product of labor and the real wage (due to,
e.g., product market power, union bargaining, and labor adjustment costs) cause
departures from it. We provide estimates of the model with panel data on 14
industries and 14 countries for 1973-93 and use them to compute the evolution of
the wage gap in Germany and the US.
Jel classification. E25, J30.
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In this paper we explore the factors driving the observed movements in the labor
share in OECD countries from 1970 to now. The labor share does not very often
generate an interest among neoclassical economists, partly because its constancy
is taken as a granted ”stylized fact of growth”.1 On the other hand, the labor
share is very much present in the political debate as a measure of how the ”bene…ts
of growth” are shared between labor and capital. For example, its decline since
the mid-1980s is often used by unions in Europe as an argument against policies
of wage moderation, and by governments in order to justify increased taxation of
pro…ts. Moreover, contrary to economists’ presumptions, there have been consid-
erable medium-run movements in the labor share over a period of 35 years, as
shown in Figures 1 to 4 for several countries. For these reasons, it is important to
understand the determinants of the labor share, which is the purpose of this paper.
It is quite striking to …nd that there are large cross-country di¤erences in the
behavior of the labor share. The UK exhibits the closest approximation to the
”growth stylized fact”, with the labor share experiencing large short-run ‡uctua-
tions around a stable level (Figure 1). In the US it undergoes sizable short-run
‡uctuations around a mild downward trend, becoming essentially ‡at in the 1980s
(Figure 2). In Japan, on the contrary, it experiences a sharp rise, slowing down
considerably after 1975 (Figure 3). The picture for continental Europe is typically
hump-shaped, with the labor share going up and then down. But actual country
experiences are heterogeneous: in Germany and France the labor share peaks in
the early 1980s (Figure 4), while in other countries like Italy, the Netherlands, and
Spain it does so in the mid-1970s.
From a cross-country perspective, it should be noted that these large di¤er-
ences across countries take place even though they are relatively similar from a
technological point of view. Table 1 shows the evolution of the labor share in the
business sector of 14 OECD countries since 1970. As evidenced by its …rst three
columns, the labor share has not converged among these countries during the 1980s
(the standard deviation has actually increased). In 1990, some countries like Fin-
land, Sweden or the UK showed labor shares around 72%, while others like France,
Germany or Italy had values around 62%.
In the policy debate, movements in the labor share are often interpreted as
changes in real wages. It is for example usually heard that because the labor share
is currently low in Europe, there is no real wage problem. But this is clearly
mistaken, since it all depends on the elasticity of labor demand. The last two
columns of Table 1 suggest that the correlation between changes in wages and
changes in the labor share is not tight (in other words, labor productivity behaves
1Recent exceptions are Blanchard (1997,1998) and Caballero and Hammour (1998).
1di¤erently across countries). For example, from 1970 to 1990 France had one of
the sharpest drops in the labor share and an above-average increase in the average
real wage, while Sweden had one of the largest increases in the labor share and one
of the lowest increases in real wages.2 Thus, there is no clear pattern, and a more
systematic exploration of the determinants of the labor share is called for.
What can we learn from analyzing the labor share? First of all, it leads to a
di¤erent approach to the study of labor demand. The traditional analysis of labor
demand relates it to factors such as wages, labor-embodied technical progress, and
capital (or, alternatively, real interest rates). This type of analysis has often run
into trouble, e.g., in estimating the elasticity of labor demand with respect to those
factors (see Hamermesh 1993). For some purposes, however, these estimates are
not needed, and the labor share provides a compact way of looking at labor demand
which directly controls for the role of the above mentioned factors.
We shall show that, as long as labor is paid its marginal product, there should
be a one-for-one relationship between the labor share and the capital-output ratio,
which we label the share-capital schedule. As long as that condition holds –and it
must, at least in long-run equilibrium–, changes in any of those three factors will
generate changes of both the labor share and the capital-output ratio along that
schedule. Any change in the labor share which shows up as a deviation from that
relationship must arise from a shift in labor demand which is not due to real wages,
capital accumulation or technical progress, and therefore has to be explained by
other considerations. In what follows, we study the role of factors which displace
the schedule, such as changes in the price of imported materials or in the skill mix,
and those which put the economy o¤ the schedule, by changing the gap between
the shadow marginal cost of labor and the wage, such as changes in markups of
prices over marginal costs, union bargaining power, or labor adjustment costs.
This approach is motivated by an attempt to understand the causes of European
unemployment. It allows us to disentangle some of the factors that played a role in
the increase in unemployment. For example, excess wage growth must necessarily
be associated with movements along the share-capital relationship. Increases in
unemployment that are associated with a shift in the position of that schedule, or
that put the economy o¤ that schedule, cannot be ascribed to just a wage push.
Our approach may then be used to interpret the observed movements in un-
employment. We show that one way to do so is to compute the wage gap, i.e.
the di¤erence between wages and the marginal product of labor at full employ-
ment. In the literature it has often been concluded that wage gaps were high in
European economies in the second half of the 1970s –and this was associated with
unemployment being Classical–, but had disappeared by the mid-1980s –so that
2The correlation coe¢cient between labor share changes and real wage changes over the period
1970-90 across these 14 countries is 0.61.
2unemployment had become Keynesian– (see Bean, 1994). Our model provides an
alternative way of computing and decomposing wage gaps, starting from estimates
of the laborsharerelationship. Underourinterpretation, a lowornegative wage gap
associated with high unemployment does not indicate a Keynesian disequilibrium
but rather a fall in labor demand that may be due to increased uncertainty, higher
markups, higher prices of imported materials, etc. Recently, Blanchard (1998) has
argued that the increase in European unemployment cannot be explained by labor
supply and user cost shifts alone, so that labor demand shifts are also a necessary
ingredient. The model proposed in this paper analyzes the nature of the latter
shifts, and our empirical estimates quantify and decompose them.
Given this aim, we analyze the empirical performance of the model, using panel
data on a sample of 14 industries in 14 OECD countries, over the period 1973-93.
We estimate the relationship between the labor share and a number of its presumed
determinants according to the model. In our estimation we follow Arellano and
Bover’s (1995) recent proposal of a system estimator for panel data, i.e. a gen-
eralized method of moments estimator with instrumental variables which employs
the information contained in the relationship between the variables in both levels
and …rst di¤erences, which helps in raising the e¢ciency of the estimation. We
…nd evidence in favor of an empirical relationship between the labor share and the
capital-output ratio, e.g. the share-capital relationship, but also signi…cant shifts
of the labor share coming from the real price of oil and from factors which cre-
ate a wedge between the shadow marginal cost of labor and the wage, like labor
adjustment costs and union bargaining power.
We then employ the empirical estimates in computing wage gaps in two large
economies, the US and Germany, and decompose their evolution according to the
theoretical model. The results from this exercise are striking. Only a small fraction
of observed movements is the wage gap, whether in Germany or the US, can be
attributed to labor-augmenting technical progress or changes in factor costs such as
wages and interest rates. Most of those movements indicate shifts in labor demand
due to the gap between the shadow cost of labor and the wage. Furthermore,
such movements are much more pronounced in Germany than in the US. This
is in accordance with the view that some labor market rigidities (most notably
employment protection legislation) are likely to increase the di¤erence between the
shadow cost of labor and wages, and to make the former more volatile.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a model of the determi-
nation of the labor share. After introducing the stripped-down model, which yields
the key relationship between the labor share and the capital-output ratio, we show
how the relaxation of various assumptions may a¤ect such relationship. Section 3
presents empirical evidence on the performance of the model on international panel
data. Section 4 exploits the empirical relationship to estimate and decompose wage
gaps in Germany and the US. Section 5 contains our conclusions.
32 Theory
We start by sorting out, from an analytical point of view, the various factors which
may explain variations in the labor share.
2.1 The labor share and the capital-output ratio
When trying to explain variations in the labor share we need to depart from the
usual assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function. We show that under the
assumptions of constant returns to scale and labor embodied technical progress,
there are strong restrictions on the behavior of the labor share, in the sense that
there should be a one-for-one relationship between it and the capital-output ratio.
Proposition 1 Assume a constant returns to scale, di¤erentiable production func-
tion by which output, Y , is produced with two factors of production, capital, K, and
labor, L, and labor-augmenting technical progress, B:
Y = F(K;BL)
Then, under the assumption that labor is paid its marginal product, there exists a
unique function g such that:
sL = g (k) (1)
where sL ´ wL=(pY ) is the labor share, with w denoting the wage and p the product
price, and k ´ K=Y is the capital-output ratio.
Proof. Let us rewrite the production function as Y = Kf(BL=K) = Kf(l),



















Eliminating l between equations (3) and (4) we …nd a univariate relationship be-
tween sL and k: q.e.d.
4Proposition 1 tells us that even if the production function is not Cobb-Douglas,
there isa stable relationship between the labor share and an observable variable, the
capital-output ratio. From now on, we shall refer to this relationship as the share-
capital (SK) schedule (orcurve). Thisrelationship isunaltered by changesin factor
prices –e.g. wages or interest rates– or quantities, or in labor-augmenting technical
progress. That is to say, any change in the labor share which is triggered by those
factors will be along that schedule, so that they cannot explain any deviation from
the SK relationship, i.e. any residual in equation (1). Note that equations (1) and
(3) are essentially the same relationship, but equation (1) is simpler to estimate,
since it does not require the computation of l, which itself requires us to compute
B, labor-augmenting technical progress.
Our aim is thus to decompose changes in the labor share between those ex-
plained by the capital-output ratio –due to changes in factor prices and labor-
augmenting technical progress– and those explained by the residual –i.e., due to
other factors discussed below–.
To illustrate Proposition 1 more concretely, let us consider what happens when





where A, B and " are technological parameters.
















From equations (6) and (7) we have:
sL = 1 ¡ (Ak)
" (8)
We therefore see that the relationship between sL and k is very simple in this
case. It is monotonic in k; either increasing or decreasing depending on the sign
of ": if labor and capital are substitutes, a lower capital intensity will increase the
labor share, and conversely if they are complements. For more general production
functions, the relationship need not be monotonic, so that the labor share can go
up and then down as some variable driving changes in k (such as real wages or
interest rates) varies.
52.2 Deviations from a stable SK relationship
We now analyze the factors that generate deviations from this simple relationship.
To do so, let us …rst de…ne more precisely the SK curve in equation (1), as a
relationship between k = 1=f(l) and ´ ´ lf0(l)=f(l), the employment elasticity of
output. Then the economy is on the SK curve in the (k;sL) plane if and only
if sL = ´, i.e. the marginal product of labor is equal to the real wage. We shall
distinguish between two types of deviations, depending on whetherthey cause shifts
of the SK curve, i.e. shifts in the g(:) function in equation (1), or movements o¤
it, i.e. increases in the di¤erence between sL and ´.
First, the SK curve is stable if only labor-augmenting technical progress a¤ects
the aggregate production function. Other factors a¤ecting it, such as A in equation
(8) for the CES case, i.e. capital-augmenting technical progress, will shift the SK
curve if they are not constant. This is the …rst possible reason for not having a
stable one-to-one relationship between sL and k.
Second, there are factors which create a wedge between the real wage and the
marginal product of labor. While they do not a¤ect the relationship between ´ and
k, they create a gap between sL and ´. These factors therefore do not shift the
SK curve, but put the economy o¤ that schedule in the (k;sL) plane. These three
sources of movements are illustrated in Figure 5. Let us now discuss each type of
deviation in detail.
2.3 Non-neutralities in the aggregate production function
We …rst discuss sources of deviations which shift the SK schedule by changing the
aggregate production function in a non-labor-augmenting way. We consider two
sources: imported materials and heterogeneity in the composition of the workforce.
2.3.1 Imported raw materials
What if there are imported raw materials whose price ‡uctuates? Unless very re-
strictive conditions hold, these ‡uctuations will shift the SK schedule in a direction
which will depend on the characteristics of the production function.
Let us assume that we have Y = F(K;BL;M), where M denotes imported
raw materials (say oil), with price q. This can be rewritten as Y = Kf(l;m); with
l ´ BL=K, as above, and m ´ M=K. L and M are set so as to maximize pro…ts.












Value added is de…ned as (see Bruno and Sachs 1985, Appendix 2B, for a
discussion): ~ Y ´ Y ¡ (q=p)M, and the SK curve is now a relationship between
6e sL; the share of labor in value added given by e sL ´ wL=(p~ Y ), and ~ k ´ K= e Y , the













Equations (9) and (10) now de…ne l and m as functions of ~ k and q=p. Plugging
these into equation (11) we get a relationship where e sL is a function not only of ~ k
but also of q=p.
To get a grasp of the e¤ects at work when the labor share changes as q=p
increases, we can di¤erentiate equations (9) to (11), to get the change in the labor































12)2 > 0 is the Hessian of the production function.
The …rst term in the brackets of (12) is positive; it is due to the fact that to
maintain a constant ratio between capital and value added as materials prices rise,
the labor-capital ratio must rise, which pushes the labor share upwards. The second
term is typically negative as long as imported materials increase the marginal
product of labor. It measures the fact that given l; imports fall when q=p increases,
which reduces the marginal product of labor and therefore wages and the labor
share. The third term is also negative. It captures the fall in wages induced by the
required increase in the labor capital ratio (taking into account the indirect e¤ect
of the induced e¤ect on m).
Thus, the price of imported materials shifts the SK schedule in an ambiguous







where A, B, C, and " are the technological parameters now. The corresponding
expression for the labor share is then:3















1=". Given the de…nition of value added we









We can thus in principle take into account the impact of changes in the price
of imported materials on the labor share by estimating (13) or a linearized variant
of it. Note that the SK schedule will shift upwards when q=p rises if and only if
" > 0: The more labor is a substitute for capital, the lower the wage fall required
to increase l so as to maintain ~ k constant when imported materials fall, and the
larger the increase in the labor share.
2.3.2 Labor heterogeneity
Until now, we have assumed a homogenous labor force. Recently, considerable
attention has been devoted to the changes in the returns to skills that have been
observed in the US and other countries since the mid-1970s. These developments
may also have a¤ected the labor income share. Thus, we may …nd it worthwhile to
extend our framework so as to distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers.
We do so in this subsection, although our data does not allow us to implement such
a distinction in our empirical analysis.
How is the labor share a¤ected if there are several types of labor, say skilled
and unskilled? In general, there will be again a breakdown in the SK schedule
as captured by equation (3). However, under some restrictions in the production
function, property (3) still holds. These restrictions are less strong, for example,
than those needed for the price of materials not to a¤ect the residual.
Proposition 2 Assume there are three inputs, capital and two types of labor, L1
and L2, and that the production function is given by:
Y = H (K;G(B1L1;B2L2))
where B1 and B2 are the respective technological parameters, and functions G(:;:)
and H(:;:) are homogeneous of degree 1. Then there exists a one-to-one relationship
between sL and k:
sL = g (k)
where g only depends on H:






The last term in brackets is decreasing in q=p and captures the e¤ect of the price of materials
on total factor productivity de…ned in terms of value added; it is multiplicative in output. The
second equation de…nes a functional form similar to equation (5) so that by making the appropriate
substitutions in equation (8) we obtain equation (13).
8Proof. The …rst-order conditions for maximization with respect to L1 and L2,
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where we have used the homogeneity of G and H. The capital-output ratio is then
simply equal to K=H(K;G), which also only depends on G=K. Substituting into
equation (14) we may then …nd a relationship between sL and k. q.e.d.
Proposition 2 tellsus that if skilled and unskilled labor enterproduction through
any aggregate function which is homogeneous of degree one, then there is still a
relationship between the labor share and the capital-output ratio, and this rela-
tionship is una¤ected by relative prices and relative factor supplies. Moreover, it
is also una¤ected by any change in the relative demand for unskilled labor due to
technology, provided such change shows up in G, but not in H.4
It is however often argued (see, for example, Krusell et al. 1997) that there
is more complementarity between skilled labor and capital than between unskilled
labor and capital. In such case, we can show that the ratio of the wages of the two
types of labor would enter the SK relationship (see Appendix A). Unfortunately,
that ratio is not observed in our database, thus we will proceed under the working
hypothesis that Proposition 2 is valid.
2.4 Di¤erences between the marginal product of labor and
the real wage
We now turn to those factors that put the economy o¤ the SK curve by generating
a gap between the marginal product of labor and the real wage. We consider three
of them: product market power, union bargaining, and labor adjustment costs.
2.4.1 Variations in the markup
Assume …rms are imperfectly competitive, so that there is a markup ¹ of prices on
marginal costs. Accordingly, the optimality condition (2) should be replaced with:
4A particular example where Proposition 2 holds is a production function which is






. This production function includes, as a special case, a

















implying a relationship such as sL = ¹¡1g(k): Clearly, if the markup is constant,
there should still be a stable relationship between sL and k. However, variations
in the markup will a¤ect that relationship and will show up in the ”residual”. For
example, if markups are countercyclical, the labor share will tend to be procyclical
once we have controlled for k:
Note that the above relationships are actually used by macroeconomists in order
to compute the markup (see Hall 1990; Rotemberg and Woodford 1991 and 1992;
and Bénabou 1992). From our point of view, this is unfortunate: many deviations
of the labor share from the predicted SK schedule may be due to factors other
than the markup. Ideally, one would want to correlate these deviations with direct
measures of the markup. In their survey paper on the cyclical behavior of markups,
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) actually discuss various sources of deviation. For
instance, they comment on the inclusion of materials in the production function,
but assume that materials are a …xed proportion of aggregate output.5
Recall now Figure 5, which summarizes the discussion up to this point. It
depicts the SK curve in the (k;sL) plane, showing that increases in wages imply
movements along the curve, but changes in the price of materials cause shifts of
the curve itself, while variations in the markup put the economy o¤ the schedule.
2.4.2 Bargaining
Another source of deviations from the SK curve is the existence of bargaining
between …rms and workers. Indeed, increases in the labor share are customar-
ily interpreted as increases in workers’ bargaining power, and it is often hastily
concluded that employment consequently has to decline. The issue is more compli-
cated, though, because everything depends on what bargaining model is assumed.
Right to manage Under the right-to-manage model, …rms and unions …rst bar-
gain over wages and then …rms set employment unilaterally, taking wages as given.
This model is widely seen as a good description of how bargaining actually takes
5These authors also mention other deviations ignored here, like overhead labor, …xed costs
in production, increasing marginal wages, or variable e¤ort. However, their paper’s focus is
on the cyclicality of the markup, rather than on the shifts in labor demand and its e¤ects on
unemployment, as ours.
10place in many countries (see, e.g., Layard et al. 1991, chapter 2). But then, because
…rms are wage takers when setting employment, the marginal product equation (2)
remains valid, and so does Proposition 1. Under this model, changes in the bar-
gaining power of workers may move the labor share, but along the SK curve, not
away from it, in a direction which depends on the elasticity of substitution between
labor and capital (see equation (8) for the CES case). More speci…cally, an increase
in workers’ bargaining power creates a wage push that increases k as …rms substi-
tute capital for labor. But the labor share may rise or fall depending on the slope
of the SK curve (i.e. the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital), and
the relationship between k and sL is una¤ected.
We can represent the right-to-manage model as follows. Wages are …rst set to





¤(w;K) ¡ ¹ V
´µ ³
¦
¤(w;K) ¡ ¹ ¦
´1¡µ
where V ¤(w;K) and ¦¤(w;K) are reduced-form union utility and pro…ts, respec-
tively, while ¹ V and ¹ ¦ are the appropriate threat points. µ is a parameter weighting
the two objective functions, which can be labeled as union bargaining power. In
the second stage of the game, the …rm determines employment by maximizing:
¦
¤(w;K) = max
L ¦(w;L;K) = pF(K;BL) ¡ wL
This de…nes an optimal employment level, L¤(K), a reduced form pro…t, ¦¤(w;K),
and a reduced form utility, V ¤(w;K) = V (w;L¤(K)). Now, the …rst-order condi-
tion for pro…t maximization is clearly (2), so that (3) and (4) are still valid. Thus
the relationship between sL and k is una¤ected by µ.6
E¢cient bargaining If, on the other hand, …rms and workers bargain over both
wages and employment, they will set employment in an e¢cient way, implying that





In the sort run, an increase in the bargaining power of workers does a¤ect the
labor share but is not re‡ected in employment. In the long-run, adjustment of the
capital stock indeed implies that changes in the bargaining power of workers also
a¤ects employment.
6Here we have assumed that bargaining over wages takes place after the capital stock is
determined. Our conclusions would be una¤ected if instead the capital stock was determined by
the …rm after wage setting, or even if bargaining took place over the capital stock, as long as
employment is determined by pro…t maximization given wages.
11How does e¢cient bargaining a¤ect the position of the economy in the (k;sL)
plane? A simple Nash bargaining model would imply that the wage is a weighted
average of the average product of labor and its opportunity cost, with the weight
on the average product being equal to workers’ bargaining power, µ (see, e.g.,









This in turns implies that w=p = µ(Bf(l)=l) + (1 ¡ µ)Bf0(l), hence (recalling
the de…nitions of sL and l):
sL = µ + (1 ¡ µ)
lf0(l)
f(l)
= µ + (1 ¡ µ)´ = µ + (1 ¡ µ)g(k)
This is a well-de…ned relationship between the labor share and the capital-
output ratio. It has the same properties as the SK curve, but is above it, re‡ecting
the fact that workers are paid more than their marginal product. As ´ < 1, an in-
crease in workers’ bargaining power shifts that relationship upwards, thus putting
the economy further o¤ the SK curve: the labor share tends to increase given the
capital-output ratio. The latter is unchanged, as it is pinned down by the equality
between marginal product and the alternative wage. Thus the labor share unam-
biguously increases. Increases in workers’ bargaining power reduce the sensitivity
of the labor share to the capital-output ratio according to this relationship. For
example, in the CES case we get:
sL = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ)(Ak)
"
2.4.3 Labor adjustment costs
We now consider how the introduction of labor adjustment costs alters the SK
relationship. This is of interest if we want to use our approach to understand the
European experience, given that regulation imposes high hiring and …ring costs
there. Adjustment costs a¤ect the behavior of the labor share for two reasons.
First, the labor share is no longer equal to wages divided by value added. Labor
costs now consist of two parts: wage costs and non-wage adjustment costs. The
adjustment costs will enter the labor share if they are a resource cost which uses
labor –for example if new hires have to be recruited by an employment agency, or if
they have tobe trained by the …rm’sexistingworkforce, thusdiverting it fromdirect
productive activity–. They will also enter the labor share if they are payments from
the …rm to the worker, as is the case for severance payments. Other components of
…ring costs such as court and arbitration procedures will have a strong labor cost
component.
12Second, adjustment costs introduce agap between the marginal revenue product
of labor and the wage, since the relevant marginal cost of labor is no longer equal
to the wage. More precisely, the marginal cost now consists of three terms: the
current wage, the current marginal adjustment cost generated by an extra unit
of labor, and the shadow expected future marginal adjustment costs generated by
that unit. Let us discuss the latter two terms in turn.
The second component will push the marginal cost of labor above the wage when
the …rm is hiring and below it when it is …ring. More speci…cally, if we assume
that real labor adjustment costs are a convex function AC (¢L), where ¢L is the
change in employment, and if the future is negected (say because the discount rate
is in…nite), we have that Bf0(l) = w + AC0(¢L), where AC0(¢L) > 0 if ¢L > 0
and AC0(¢L) < 0 if ¢L < 0 (see, e.g., Bentolila and Bertola 1990). If adjustment
costs are not part of the labor costs included in the labor share, this implies that
sL > g(k) if ¢L < 0 and sL < g(k) if ¢L > 0, thus suggesting that one should add
a decreasing function of the change in employment to our explanatory variables.
In Appendix A we show that this intuition is roughly valid as well when we take
into account that adjustment costs also enter labor costs.
As to the shadow expected future marginal adjustment costs, they depend,
among other things, on the degree of uncertainty. Higher uncertainty might be
expected to increase the likelihood that a worker be …red, thus increasing the
shadow cost of labor and pushing the economy further below the SK curve. This
is not unambiguous, though. In principle, as in the case of investment (see Nickell
1977), an increase in uncertainty may well increase incentives to hire. However,
if we …nd the opposite e¤ect more plausible, then we should expect a negative
relationship between uncertainty and the labor share, given the capital-output
ratio.
From an empirical point of view, the preceding arguments indicate that both
taking current adjustment costs into account in the labor share, and taking mar-
ginal adjustment costs –current and future– into account in the marginal cost of
labor, should lead to adding a decreasing function of ¢L and a function of perceived
uncertainty, ¾t, as explanatory variables for the labor share, i.e.:
sLt = f(kt;¢Lt;¾t)
where it is likely that f0
2(:) < 0, f0
3(:) < 0.
133 Evidence
We now investigate empirically the factors driving the evolution of the labor share
in 14 OECD countries since 1970, following our model. Data availability, however,
precludes analyzing all the variables which are relevant according to the model.
We focus on four sources of variation: movements along the SK relationship –
i.e., shocks whose e¤ect on sL is entirely mediated by k, such as changes in the
prices of capital and labor, and labor-augmenting technical progress–; one shifter
of the SK curve, namely changes in the price of raw materials; and two sources of
movements o¤ the SK schedule, namely changes in union bargaining power and
labor adjustment costs. We start by documenting a few stylized facts present in the
data, we then discuss the equation to be estimated and the econometric techniques
used, and we …nally show the empirical results.
3.1 Stylized facts
The SK schedule is a technological relationship, and so it is more appropriate to
investigate it at the industry than at the country level. Therefore, we use indus-
try data from the OECD International Sectoral Data Base (ISDB), which includes
information on output, employment, capital, and factor shares for 14 OECD coun-
tries over the period 1970-93, disaggregated at the 1- or 2-digit level. The set of
industries analyzed does not span the whole economy, but comes close to doing so.
Appendix B provides details on the database.
Our key variables are the labor share (sL) and the capital-output ratio (k). The
variable sL is de…ned as the share of labor in nominal value added net of indirect
taxes and k is the ratio of the real capital stock to real value added. In other words,
they correspond to e sL and e k, as de…ned in the theory section, although we will omit
the e symbol for simplicity. Table 2 presents the overall statistics of these two
variables for all industries, countries, and years in the sample.7 Table 3 shows
1973-93 averages (the sample period used in the econometric estimates, see below)
for sL and k by industry and by country. For countries, averages for the whole
economies’ business sector are shown as well. The di¤erence between these and the
ISDB sample averages stem from the absence of a few sectors (sometimes only for
certain years), and from the inclusion of an imputation for the labor income of the
self-employed in the former.8 Interestingly, within our sample, both variables vary
more widely across industries than across countries: the range for the labor share,
for example, goes from 20% in agriculture to 75% in machinery. These numbers
help us make the case for the industry approach to the data followed in this section.
7The remaining variables will be introduced below.
8Descriptive statistics of the labor share in our sample when it is adjusted for the labor
remuneration of the self-employed appear in Table A2 of Appendix B.
143.2 Empirical speci…cation
For empirical purposes, we assume the following multiplicative form:
sL;ijt = g(kijt;Sijt)h(Xijt) (15)
where the subindexes denote: industries (i = 1;:::;14), countries (j = 1;:::;14),
and time (t = 1973;:::;1993).9 Here g(k;S) captures the SK schedule, which is
a¤ected by S. Followingsection 2.3, and given data limitations, under our empirical
speci…cation S only contains the national real price of imported oil, qj=pj.
On the other hand, h(X) captures discrepancies between the marginal product
of labor and the wage –wage bargaining, adjustment costs, etc.– which may move
the economy o¤ the SK relationship. Following section 2.4, X includes three
variables. First, the e¤ect of current labor adjustment costs is captured through
the industry employment net growth rate (¢lnnij).10 Although we would like to
separate out gross increases from gross reductions in employment, so as to allow
for the asymmetry between hiring and …ring, these ‡ows are not available in our
dataset. Second, the e¤ect of future expected adjustment costs is captured through
a measure of uncertainty: the standard deviation of the growth rate of industry
output (¾ij). Considering the length of the sample period, we compute this variable
as a 5-year, backward-looking, moving average (denoted by »). Lastly, the e¤ect of
workers’ bargaining power (µ), which might matter in an e¢cient bargains setup,
is captured by the number of labor con‡icts nationwide, normalized by the number
of employees in the preceding year. This variable is also measured as a 5-year
backward-looking moving average and it is denoted by f lcrj.11
Our model suggests that the coe¢cients on the variables in X might depend
on the type of labor market institutions prevailing in each country, namely labor
adjustment costs and union power. For example, the change in employment and
uncertainty are likely to have a greater impact in countries where adjustment costs
are important, i.e., which have more stringent employment protection regulations.
We lack enough degrees of freedom to allow for full-‡edged interactions, but we
can capture sizable di¤erences through simple dummies. Thus, we interact the
variables which would enter if adjustment costs are important, ¢lnnij and e ¾ij,
with a dummy variable, labeled rigid, which is equal to one if adjustment costs
are relatively high in the country and zero otherwise. The grouping of countries
9The data start in 1970, but the period of estimation is 1973-93 because we lose the …rst 3
years due to the dating at t–2 of instrumental variables in …rst di¤erences.
10Employment here refers to the number of employees.
11We also tried the the number of workers involved and work-days lost due to con‡icts as
alternative numerators of the con‡ict rate. As to the timing of lcr, were tried a 5-year moving
average of output volatility centered around year t and a 3-year forward-looking moving average.
The empirical results reported below were scarcely sensitive to these variations.
15follows the information on severance pay and notice periods in Layard et al. (1991,
p. 420). Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK, and the
US are classi…ed as having ‡exible labor markets, and the remaining countries as
having rigid ones.
As to the e¤ect of bargaining power (µ), at least two dimensions need to be
taken into account. First, the higher the degree of centralization of wage bargains,
the higher the expected e¤ect of union power on the wage share. The reason is that
higher centralization will move the economy closer to the e¢cient bargains model
since national unions are likely to internalize the e¤ect of their wage choice on
national employment (Calmfors and Dri…ll 1988). Secondly, the economy will also
be closer to the e¢cient bargains benchmark the higher the degree of inter-union
and inter-…rm coordination (Layard et al. 1991). Thus, we distinguish between
countries with varying degrees of corporatism, broadly de…ned, e.g.: (a) a high
degree of both centralization and coordination, labeled as corp2 (Denmark, Fin-
land, Norway, and Sweden); (b) high centralization but low coordination, labeled
as corp1 (Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands); and
(c) a low degree of both centralization and coordination (Canada, Japan, the UK,
and the US). Our ranking on the degree of centralization of wage bargains follows
the corporatism index of Calmfors and Dri…ll (1988), and the composite index of
the degree of inter-union and inter-…rm coordination follows Layard et al. (1991,
p. 419).12
Again for empirical purposes, we impose further structure by assuming that the

















where Xijt = (¢lnnijt; ~ ¾ijt; f lcrjt;vijt), and v is a residual term, so that ¯6 ´ 1.
Now substitute equations (16) and (17) into (15) and take logs, to arrive at the
basic estimated equation:
12The corporatism (CORP) ranking is as follows (from less to more, e.g. 1 to 14): Canada,
the US, Japan, Italy, the UK, France, Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland,
Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. For coordination (COORD), we add up the scores assigned to
countries for union (UNCD) and employer (EMCD) coordination by Layard et al. (1991), both
going from 1 (low) to 3 (high), obtaining the following scores: Canada, the UK, and the US (2),
Australia and Italy (3), Belgium, France, Japan, and the Netherlands (4), Germany (5), and
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden (6). Thus, corp2 includes countries with CORP>10
and COORD>5, and corp1 those with 5<CORP<11 (plus Italy) and 2<COORD<6.
16lnsL;ijt = ¸ +
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+ ¯3 ¢lnnijt + ¯4 e ¾ijt + ¯5
f lcrjt + vijt (18)
where ¸ is a constant term. Note that the coe¢cients on the main technology
variables are allowed to vary by industry through interactions with the di industry
dummies.
Lastly, to allow for the di¤erential e¤ects of country-speci…c labor market in-
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00
5 (corp2 f lcrjt) + vijt (19)
3.3 Econometric methods
3.3.1 General issues
Equation (18) is estimated using panel data techniques, where individual units of
observation are industry-country units. Also, since some observations are missing
–either at the beginning or the end of the sample period–, we have an unbalanced
panel (see Table A1).
The labor share and the capital-output ratio are jointly determined variables
appearing in the basic SK relationship, which is a …rst order optimality condi-
tion. When there are adjustment costs, the same is true of the employment growth
rate. These variables are jointly endogenous and are therefore instrumented, since
ordinary least squares estimation would be biased. We discuss the choice of instru-
mental variables below.
We expect the presence of individual …xed e¤ects in the equation. If these are
omitted and correlated with any of the regressors included, the resulting estimates
are biased. A standard way of solving this problem is to estimate the equation
in …rst di¤erences. It is then typical to use predetermined variables in levels, like
e.g. lags of the regressors, as instrumental variables. However, the absence of in-
formation about the parameters of interest in the levels of the variables usually
causes the loss of a substantial part of the variation in the data, often resulting in
poor estimates. This problem can, however, be overcome if we are willing to as-
sume that some of the regressors have a constant correlation with the …xed e¤ects,
an assumption whose validity only requires stationarity in mean of the regressors
17given the e¤ects, which moreover can be tested through the overidentifying restric-
tions. Arellano and Bover (1995) note that, in this case, the …rst di¤erences of
the predetermined variables are valid instruments for the equations in levels. In
e¤ect, they propose, in addition to using instruments in levels for the equations in
…rst di¤erences, to use instruments in …rst di¤erences for the equations in levels.
The model behind this …rst-di¤erences plus levels, or system, estimator is an in-
termediate case between the …xed-e¤ects model, in which all explanatory variables
are potentially correlated with the e¤ects, and the random e¤ects model, in which
none is. Arellano and Bover (1995) show that the system estimator may yield large
e¢ciency gains vis-à-vis the pure …rst-di¤erence estimator (see also Blundell and
Bond, 1997).
We follow this proposal here. The estimation is carried out with the dynamic
panel data program DPD98, which implements the Arellano-Bover system estima-
tor. This is an extension of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), which exploits the appropriate orthogonal-
ity conditions for the chosen instruments, minimizing the di¤erence between the
sample moments and their zero population value.
3.3.2 Techniques
We can rewrite equation (18) in the form:13
ykt = ¯
0xkt + ±k + vkt
where, within this subsection, subindex k denotes an (i;j) industry-country unit
(k = 1;:::;N), ykt = lnsL;ijt, xkt =
³
di lnkijt;di ln(qjt=pjt);¢lnnijt; e ¾ijt; f lcrjt
´
,
vkt = vijt, ±k denotes …xed e¤ects, and ¯ the parameter vector. The number of
units is N = 165 and t = 1;:::;Tk, where Tk · 21 is the number of time periods
available on the k-th unit. The vkt are assumed to be independently distributed
across units with zero mean, but arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity across units
and time are allowed for.
The Tk equations for unit k can be written in the stacked form:
yk = xk¯ + ¶k±k + vk
where xk is a data matrix of the time series of the x’s and ¶k is a Tk £ 1 vector of

















































k denote a transformation of xk and yk, in our case a combination
of …rst di¤erences and levels. Zk is a matrix of instrumental variables and Hk a
weighting matrix. We report two-step estimates for coe¢cients and t-ratios, which
use Hk = b v¤
kb v¤0
k , where b v¤
k are one-step residuals, since it is more e¢cient when the
vkt are heteroskedastic (White, 1982).14
3.3.3 Instrumental variables and speci…cation tests
Given our assumptions, there is a set of moment conditions relating to equations in
…rst di¤erences and another set relating to equations in levels, which are combined









k is the matrix of instruments for the equations in …rst
di¤erences and ZL
k is that for the equations in levels.
We treat the labor share, the capital-output ratio, the change in employment,
and the real oil price aspotentially endogenous. Two variables, the proxies for labor
con‡icts and uncertainty –constructed as backward-looking moving averages– are
treated as predetermined.
We use three types of instruments. The …rst type consists of lagged regressors,
which can be taken as predetermined, i.e. the capital-output ratio and the rate
of change in employment (lnkij and ¢lnnij). In the …rst-di¤erenced equations,
we use the level of the real capital stock (lnKij) rather than lnkij itself, which
is more likely to be predetermined. This is, however, not feasible in the levels
equations, due to the assumption of stationarity of the (di¤erenced) instruments.
We also added the square log capital stock, (lnKij)2, to capture potential non-
linearities. Since di¤erencing induces a …rst-order moving average of the residuals,
we use the second lags of these variables. As a second type of instrument we use
the contemporaneous values of the predetermined regressors, f lcrj and e ¾ij, plus the
…rst and second lag of the latter. We also include the growth rate of national GDP
(¢lnyj).
For lack of degrees of freedom, we cannot interact all instruments with industry
dummies, so we do it only for the lagged capital stock (capital-labor ratio in the
levels equations), the labor con‡ict rate, and the growth rate of GDP. In the case
of the extended speci…cation in equation (19), when we include in the estimated
14Arellano and Bond (1991) show that, in …rst-di¤erence estimation, two-step estimators of
asymptotic standard errors may be too small. However, results in Blundell and Bond (1997)
indicate that this is much less true for the system estimator used here.
19equation a given dummy variable interacted with any of the regressors, we also add
that dummy to the instrument set.
The speci…cation is checked by means of the Sargan statistic (ST), a test of
overidentifying restrictions for the validity of the instrument set, which is distrib-
uted as a Â2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instrumental variables
minus the number of parameters.15 Since the set of instruments used for the equa-
tions in …rst di¤erences is a subset of that used in the system of …rst-di¤erenced and
levels equations, we also report a more speci…c test of the additional instruments
used in the levels equations, the Di¤erence Sargan test (DS), which compares the
Sargan statistics for the system estimator and the corresponding …rst-di¤erenced
estimator.16
We also report a statistic for the absence of second-order serial correlation in the
…rst-di¤erenced residuals, b vkt¡b vk;t¡1, labeled m2. This is based on the standardized
average residual autocovariances, which are asymptotically N(0;1) variables under
the null of no autocorrelation, and should not be signi…cantly di¤erent from zero
if the residuals in levels are serially uncorrelated (note that, due to di¤erencing,
…rst-order autocorrelation is expected ex-ante).
3.4 Empirical results
Table 4 contains the estimates of our basic speci…cation, equation (18)- They pro-
vide support for the SK schedule: the capital-output ratio shows up signi…cantly,
which suggests the presence of departures from the Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion. The covariation is positively signed in 11 out of 14 industries, suggesting that
labor and capital are most often complements, rather than substitutes (see equation
(8) for the CES case). The shifter of the SK relationship we have included, the real
oil price, is also signi…cant, attracting negative coe¢cients (except for agriculture)
and thus resolving the theoretical ambiguity (see equation (12) for the CES case).
Turning to movements o¤ the SK curve, in Table 4 both variables capturing
the e¤ects of labor adjustment costs, the employment growth rate and output
uncertainty are signi…cant, showing the expected negative sign. Surprisingly, the
















is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with as many degrees of freedom as overidentifying
restrictions, under the null hypothesis of the validity of the instruments. See Arellano and Bond
(1991).
16Let STd » Â2
q1¡n be the Sargan statistic for the …rst-di¤erence estimation, with q1 its number
of instruments, so that q1 + q2 is the number of instrument in the system estimation, and n the
number of parameters. The Di¤erence Sargan test is distributed as DS = ST ¡ STd » Â2
q2.
20labor con‡ict rate, our proxy for workers’ bargaining power, attracts a negative
coe¢cient. One interpretation of this …nding relies on delayed responses to wage
pushes (Caballero and Hammour 1998, see section 4 below).17 In any event, as
we shall see, the sign on this variable depends on the degree of corporatism in the
country.
Test statistics for the validity of the instrument set and for second-order cor-
relation in the residuals do not show any problems, although the Sargan test for
the validity of the extra instruments used in the system estimation, vis-à-vis the
reduced set for the …rst-di¤erenced one, is passed at the margin.
Table 5 provides the estimation results forthe extended speci…cation in equation
(19). Di¤erent columns include a di¤erent set of regressors. In column (1) we
interact the employment growth rate with the labor market rigidity dummy and
obtain that, as expected, it is signi…cant only in countries with more rigid labor
markets. Nevertheless, column (2) shows that output volatility, introduced so as to
capture the impact of future expected adjustment costs, does not appear to have
a signi…cantly di¤erent e¤ect in countries with ‡exible and rigid labor markets.
When we add the corporatism dummies interacted with the labor con‡ict rate, we
…nd, in column (3), that the negative sign found in Table 4 comes from countries
with relatively centralized bargaining but only a moderate amount of overall inter-
union and inter-…rm coordination. The e¤ect is, on the other hand, positive for
both countries with decentralized bargaining and low coordination, and those with
highly centralized bargaining and high coordination. Regarding centralization, this
…nding is reminiscent of the hump-shaped relationship between centralization and
economic performance found by Calmfors and Dri¢ll (1988). As to coordination,
in a cross-section analysis of 20 OECD countries, Nickell (1997), …nds that union
coverage tends to raise unemployment, but this is o¤set if unions and employers can
coordinate their bargaining activities. The di¤erences we have uncovered regarding
the impact of labor con‡icts in coordinated vs. uncoordinated countries is a new
interesting …nding, relevant to this debate. At this stage of our research, we lack a
simple explanation, but we believe this fact deserves further research.
In column (4) we can see that the results in columns (1) and (3) are robust
to the joint introduction of the interactions added in those two columns. On the
other hand, further addition of the interaction of output volatility with the rigidity
dummy in column (5), while keeping all signs unchanged, lowers the signi…cance of
several coe¢cients.
We should note that our results may be a¤ected by measurement error. In our
17An alternative interpretation would require us to implicit model the cyclical behavior of
bargaining power. In Goodwin’s (1967) model of business cycles, unions tend to strike when the
capital share goes up. In his own words: ”The improved pro…tability carries the seed of its own
destruction by engendering a too vigorous expansion of output and employment, thus destroying
the reserve army of labor and strengthening labor’s bargaining power” (p. 58).
21data, sL is computed as the share of the remuneration of employees in value added.
In general, part of the remuneration of the self-employed is a return to labor rather
than to capital. However, there is no natural way of imputing that part. One way
of doing it is to assume that the self-employed earn the same wage as employees.
However, typical calculations imply that the labor remuneration of self-employed
labor is actually lower than that of employees, which is not so surprising given
that, for instance, social security taxes on the latter are generally much higher
than on the former. Thus, as a rough approximation, we have assumed that the
self-employed earn two-thirds as much as employees (an assumption which gives
estimates for the labor share which are close to those reported, for example, by
Eurostat in its European Economy review). Descriptive statistics of the sample
when the adjusted labor share are given in Table A2 of Appendix C.
In Appendix C we present the estimation results for equation (18), using the ad-
justed labor share, s¤
L. Note that the sample size is now close to one-fourth smaller
than before, because average indirect tax rates, which are needed for computing
the adjusted labor share, are missing more often than the remaining variables. This
tends to render the econometric results less informative than those for the unad-
justed labor share. Also, we do not expect to …nd exactly the same coe¢cients as
with the unadjusted labor share, since, for example, both …ring costs and union
power a¤ect employees but not the self-employed. A comparison of the results in
Tables 4 and 5 with those of Tables A3 and A4 reveals a drop in the individual
signi…cance of the individual coe¢cients on the capital-output ratio and the real
price of oil. The signs of the coe¢cients on the shifters o¤ the SK schedule are
maintained, with the coe¢cients on the change in employment and output volatility
generally becoming stronger, and those on labor con‡icts becoming weaker.
In sum, we have tested our model of the determination of the labor share,
albeit without imposing tight restrictions from the theory. The results con…rm
that a share-capital schedule exists, that the real price of oil shifts it, and that
there are signi…cant deviations from it due to gaps between the marginal product
of labor and the wage, arising from labor adjustment costs and union power. We
now turn to a direct application of these empirical results.
4 Application: wage gaps revisited
4.1 Another look at the wage gap
Having checked that the theory is a reasonable guide to the behavior of the labor
share, we now employ it in trying to shed some light on the causes of European
unemployment, by revisiting the so-called wage gap (see Artus, 1984; Bruno and
Sachs, 1985). The wage gap approach typically takes the evolution of wages as
22exogenous and compares them to the marginal product of labor at full employment.
That is, recalling the production function Yt = F(Kt;BtLt), at time t the wage






where ¹ L is the full employment level. Then, assumptions are typically made about
the production function and the behavior of productivity in order to estimate a
path for the denominator. This approach thus essentially amounts to looking at
the evolution of wages vis-à-vis labor productivity. This is quite close to looking
at the labor share, so that in most of continental Europe, where the labor share
has risen and then fallen to its 1970 level (see Figure 4), it is generally concluded
that the wage gap has disappeared. The question is then how to reconcile this with
the persistence of high unemployment. In the wage gap literature, a low wage gap
is generally interpreted as an indication that most unemployment is Keynesian,
i.e. due to persistent slack associated with the failure of nominal prices and wages
to adjust. Given the persistence of high unemployment in Europe, we …nd that
interpretation hard to believe.
How can our approach shed light on this issue? First, we can provide a new
estimate of the wage gap, based on our analysis of the labor share, which may
potentially di¤er from those available in the literature. Second, we are able to de-
compose changes in the wage gap in a new way. We have shown that we can break
down movements in the labor share into three components: (i) movements along
the SK schedule, which represent the optimal adjustment of …rm’s desired employ-
ment to changes in prices and labor-augmenting technical progress; (ii) movements
of the SK schedule itself, which may arise from non-neutral technical progress, or
equivalently changes in the price of imported materials; and (iii) movements o¤ the
SK schedule, which represent discrepancies between the marginal product of la-
bor and the wage. Possible sources of such discrepancies include adjustment costs,
wage bargaining, and markups.
The …rst source of shocks –movements along the SK schedule– generates a
negative relationship between the wage gap and employment: it simply captures
the fact that, given the production function, the marginal product of labor is
decreasing with employment.
The second source of shocks –movements of the SK curve– will typically a¤ect
the marginal product of labor both at full and at current employment. It does not
generate any clear correlation between employment and the wage gap. Both can go
eitherway, and thisdependson howwagesreact toshocks. However, if the elasticity
of the marginal product of labor with respect to employment is unchanged, then
such shocks can only increase the wage gap if at the same time unemployment
increases. In that case they will generate the same correlation between the two
23variables as the …rst source of shocks.
The last source of shocks –those putting the economy o¤ the SK curve, such as
an increase in uncertainty under labor adjustment costs– a¤ects the gap between
the marginal product of laborand the wage. An increase in that gap tends to reduce
both employment and wage, while increasing the marginal product. Therefore
we will observe an increase in unemployment associated with a fall in the wage
gap. This source of shocks thus generates a negative correlation between these two
variables.
Analytically, this argument runs as follows.18 Let us rewrite equation (20)
as 1 + WGt = wt=[ptBtF0
2(Kt;Bt¹ Lt;St)]; where St captures shift factors in the
aggregate production function other than labor-augmenting technical progress.
Then, the …rst-degree homogeneity of the production function and the de…nition
lt ´ BtLt=Kt, imply that:









where ¹ lt ´ Bt¹ Lt=Kt.
Recall now the multiplicative form we assumed for the labor share in equation
(15): sLt = g(kt;St)h(Xt). Making use of the identity between g(k) and lf0(l)=f(l)
given by equation (3), equation (21) boils down to:





This equation tells us that the wage gap is the product of the component of
the labor share which is o¤ the SK schedule, times the ratio between the marginal
product of labor at current employment and at full employment. This ratio is
the true wage gap; it tells us by how much wages would have to fall to eliminate
unemployment, holding the production function and the Xt variables constant.
The …rst term, on the other hand, captures a labor demand shift, which tells us
that, given the unemployment rate, wages must fall if the gap between the shadow
cost of labor and the wage increases.
Note that our empirical estimates allow us to recover h(Xt), since we assumed
in equation (17) that: h(Xt) = exp(§k¯kxk
t), where Xt = (¢lnnt; ~ ¾t; f lcrt;vt).
Moreover, we can also approximate the second term, f0
1(lt;St)=f0
1(¹ lt;St), so as to
construct a series for the change in the wage gap and its components. We have:
¢WGt ¼ ¢ln(1 + WGt)





18In this subsection we ignore the sector and country subindexes, as well as interactions with
the rigidity and corporatism dummies, for simplicity.
24Noting that f0
1(lt;St) = g(kt;St)=(ktlt) and denoting ¹ kt = 1=f(¹ lt;St) this can be
expressed as:
¢WGt ¼ ¢lnh(Xt) +
³








¢lnlt ¡ ¢ln¹ lt
´
Now, using equations (3) and (4), and neglecting second order terms in u we
have that ln¹ kt ¼ lnkt¡g(kt;St)ut and ¢lnlt ¼ ¢ln¹ lt¡¢ut: If we further assume
that g is isoelastic in k and log-separable in k and S; as in equation (16), g (kt;St) =
k
'
t °(St) = k
¯1
t (qt=pt)¯2, then the above equation can be rewritten as:
¢WGt ¼ ¢lnh(Xt) + (' ¡1)¢(k
'
t °(St)ut) + ¢ut
or





t °(St)) ut + ' k
'
t °(St) ¢ut (22)
or, for use in the next subsection:
¢WGt ¼ ¢lnh(Xt) + (1 ¡ k
'
t °(St)(1 ¡')) ¢ut + (' ¡ 1)¢(k
'
t °(St)) ut (23)
The …rst term in equation (22) is the contribution of the labor demand shift. If
it is equal to, say, -1%, it means that labor demand has fallen, so that wages must
fall by 1% to maintain unemployment constant. In other words, we are referring to
labor demand shocks which increase the wedge between the wage and the shadow
cost of labor, thus the measured wage gap falls, since the wage is below the true
labor cost. We can further decompose this labor demand shift into an explained
component (i.e., that explained by our explanatory variables, ¢n, e ¾, and f lcr) and
an unexplained one, which is the contribution of the residual. This residual may be
interpreted as capturing changes in the price-cost markup, but it may also contain
other shocks.
The change in the true wage gap is the sum of all other terms in equation (22).
If it is equal to, say, 1%, it means that wages would have to fall by 1% more in order
to restore full employment. This may be due to the fact that unemployment has
risen or to a change in the shape of the marginal product schedule. It can be further
decomposed as follows. The second term, (1 ¡k
'
t °(St))¢ut, is the contribution to
the wage gap of changes in the discrepancy between the marginal product of labor
at current employment and at full employment, holding the employment elasticity





t °(St) ¢ut, is the contribution of all changes in the employment elasticity
of output, whether induced by shifts in the production function captured by the
shift factor S or by the variation of that elasticity as k and u change.
Note that while the true wage gap may fall at times of rising unemployment (if
the employment elasticity of the marginal product falls), its value is always positive
if unemployment ispositive. The reason is that if we start fromzero unemployment,
then the true wage gap must rise as ut rises, since (1 ¡ k
'
t °(St)(1 ¡')) > 0.19 In
our empirical estimates, with the speci…cation of Table 4, this expression takes an
average value of 0.35, being negative only for 60 observations (2% of the sample)
in the agricultural sector.20
4.2 The evolution of wage gaps in two countries
We now show computed changes in the wage gaps for the US and (West) Germany,
the only large economies for which there are data for all 14 industries over the
full period. In our computation we use the estimates in section 3, by considering
each country as a basket of industries and applying the estimated coe¢cients to
the particular industry con…guration in the country. We use the parameter esti-
mates obtained from the speci…cation in column (4) of Table 5, which allow the
coe¢cients on the variables in Xt to vary depending on the country’s degrees of
labor market rigidity and corporatism. The results would be very similar if we
alternatively used the parameters in column (5). Along with data on unemploy-
ment rates, those estimates then allow us to perform the decomposition in equation
(23). Implementing it with industry level data entails some problems, discussed in
Appendix A, which we solve by computing the aggregates in equation (23) as geo-
metric averages, weighting industry-varying variables by their employment shares.
We should note from the outset that this procedure may only provide a rough
approximation to wage gaps, since parameter estimates from the panel result from
averaging underlying coe¢cients which may vary across countries, and since, more-
over, the list of sectors available for estimation is not exhaustive.
Figure 6 depicts the part of wage gap levels explained by the regressors in both
countries, calculated by accumulating changes since 1973, taken as the reference
year (=100). Figure 7 shows the decomposition described in equation (23) taking
one term at a time (i.e. assuming changes in the other two terms were absent),
also in index form. Figure 8 presents the contributions to the labor demand shifts
of each of the relevant variables: ¢lnnt, ~ ¾t, and f lcrt. Lastly, the computed shifts
19Note that (1 ¡ k
'
t °(St)(1 ¡ ')) = 1 ¡ g(kt;St) + ktg0(kt;St), kt = 1=f(lt), and g(kt;St) =
ltf0(lt)=f(lt). Thus, g0(kt;St) = ltf0(lt) ¡ (f0(lt) + ltf00(lt))(f(lt)=f0(lt)), so that ktg0
t(kt;St) =
g(kt;St) ¡ 1 ¡ltf00(lt)=f0(lt). Consequently, 1 ¡ g(kt;St) + ktg0(kt;St) = ¡ltf00(lt)=f0(lt) > 0.
20The same is true for the estimates in column (4) of Table 5, used in the next subsection.
26and their components are provided in Table A5, which also contains the evolution
of wage gaps inclusive of the contribution of the unexplained residuals.
Figure 6 indicates increases in wage gaps in both Germany and the US in the
mid-1970s and early-1980s, but in Germany the increases are larger and tend to
disappear more slowly. Moreover, Germany su¤ers a post-reuni…cation surge in the
wage gap which is absent in the US.
Figure 7 suggests that the marginal product of labor in Germany is around 2%
higher, holding capital constant, than what it would be if unemployment was at its
1973 level. The equivalent …gure forthe US, where unemployment has also risen but
by less, is below one percent. The …gure also reveals that in both countries there are
large shifts in labor demand that a¤ect the measured wage gap. In Germany these
movements are countercyclical and Figure 8 shows that they are chie‡y explained
by the contribution of adjustment costs: in recessions the shadow cost of labor goes
down relative to the wage, labor demand is thus high –meaning higher than absent
adjustment costs– and so is the measured wage gap, as in recessions adjustment
costs drive a positive wedge between the wage and the marginal product of labor.
Other components, such as changes in union power or uncertainty, play virtually no
role in Germany. In the United States, the labor demand component is more erratic
and less persistent. It is also chie‡y driven by adjustment costs, but a continuing
decline in union power has also contributed to bringing down wages relative to the
marginal product of labor. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, there is virtually
no contribution to the wage gap, in either country, by factors that change the
shape of the production function, e.g. changes in the capital-output ratio –driven
by labor-augmenting technical progress or movements in factor costs such as wages
and interest rates– or in the real price of oil.
Recently Blanchard (1997,1998) and Caballero and Hammour(1998) have sought
to explain the di¤erent evolution of unemployment in continental European and
Anglo-Saxon countries since the 1970s, bearing in mind the evolution of the labor
share. Blanchard (1997) explains such evolution, in continental Europe, as result-
ing from responses to labor supply shifts in the 1970s (oil shocks, the productivity
growth slowdown, changes in labor institutions) and labor demand shocks in the
1980s. His attempt at distinguishing between shifts in the distribution of rents and
biased technological change as sources of the latter is however inconclusive. Our
results support the idea that the European unemployment experience cannot be
understood without recourse to signi…cant labor demand shifts. While they are
not readily comparable to his, since we follow a di¤erent approach, there are some
similarities. First, Blanchard (1997) computes much higher labor demand shifts
for Germany than for the US (Germany: –6% over 1970-81, 3% over 1981-95; US:
–3% and 0%, respectively), in accordance with our own estimates. Second, Blan-
chard (1998) reports computations of yearly labor demand shifts only for France,
which moreover vary depending on two exogenously chosen parameters: the degree
27of wage inertia and the elasticity of substitution of a CES production function.
Nevertheless, a common theme is that computed labor demand shifts for France
tend to be negative in the mid-1970s, positive in the …rst half of the 1980s, and
negative again in the second half of the 1980s, while our results for Germany follow
a similar pattern (cfr. his Figure 11 with our Table A4).21
As the …gures in Table A4 make clear, however, the evolutions commented so
far are dwarfed by the contribution of the residual, i.e. the unexplained component
in the gap between wages and marginal product. In the case of Germany, this
unexplained component accounts for most of the hump-shaped pattern of the labor
share in the 1970s and 1980s. This result casts doubts over the interpretation of
that stylized fact suggested by Caballero and Hammour (1998). According to these
authors, the hump shape is due to the lagged response of capital-labor substitution
to initial wage pushes. That is, wage pushes increase the labor share in the short
run because of sluggishness in labor demand adjustment (due to institutions which
raise labor’s capability of appropriating rents, such as …ring costs, unemployment
bene…ts, and social security contributions; and to increases in speci…city). These
pushes, however, reduce the labor share in the long run, as substitution of capital
for labor works its way. Such pattern is consistent with a negatively sloped SK
curve, and the e¤ect of adjustment costs that we have found. But the contributions
of ¢n and k actually fail to pick up the hump-shaped pattern for the labor share,
which is mostly driven by the residual. This suggests that we have to look for other
explanations.
An interesting …nding is that the residual in the US exhibits the same hump-
shaped pattern as in Germany, despite the fact that the total labor share does
not exhibit this behavior. Thus it seems that our empirical procedure allows us
to recover some labor demand shock common to the two countries, which was not
apparent in the raw data. At this stage, we can only speculate about the nature
of that demand shock. The obvious interpretation in terms of markups seems
implausible; only further research can uncover the factors underlying this similar
evolution of the residuals in Germany and the US.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we show that movements in the labor share can be fruitfully de-
composed into movements along a technology-determined curve –the share-capital
(SK) schedule–, shifts of this locus, and deviations from it. Movements along the
SK curve capture changes in factor prices such as wage pushes and changes in real
interest rates, as well as the contribution of labor-augmenting technical progress.
21For Germany, Blanchard (1997) simply reports a labor demand shift of -6% over 1970-81 and
of 3% over 1981-95.
28The curve is itself shifted by factors such as non-labor embodied technical progress
or changes in the price of imported materials. Lastly, other sources of variation of
the labor share are represented by movements o¤ the SK curve, and are accounted
for by deviations from marginal cost pricing such as changes in markups, labor
adjustment costs, and changes in workers’ bargaining power.
We analyze the performance of the model empirically, using data on a panel
of 14 industries in 14 OECD countries, over the period 1973-93, by estimating
the relationship between the labor share and the capital-output ratio, controlling
for variables intended to capture some of the factors mentioned above. In the
estimation we follow a recent proposal by Arellano and Bover (1995) of a system
estimator for panel data, i.e. a generalized method of moments estimator with
instrumental variables which exploits the information contained in the relationship
between the variables in both levels and …rst di¤erences.
We …nd a signi…cant relationship between the two key variables, i.e. favorable
evidence for the SK schedule. There is also evidence of movements in the labor
share due to either shifts of the SK schedule, arising from changes in the real price
of oil, and of movements o¤ such schedule, arising from labor adjustment costs and
changes in workers’ bargaining power.
We then employ the empirical estimates in trying to shed light on the sources
of European unemployment, through the concept of wage gaps, i.e. the di¤erence
between wages and the marginal product of labor. We compute wage gaps in two
large economies, the US and Germany and decompose its evolution according to
the theoretical model. Our results indicate that there are sizable labor demand
shifts in both countries, especially in Germany, where they essentially arise from
the presence of labor adjustment costs.
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Algebraic derivations
A.1 Relationship between the labor share and the skill premium (section
2.3.2)
To show how labor heterogeneity a¤ects the SK relationship, we follow Krusell
et al. (1997) and consider the special case where the production function is:




Intuitively, this production function means that tasks can be done either by capital
or unskilled labor, but that skilled labor is needed to monitor tasks. We can show
that there is now a relationship between the labor share, the capital-output ratio,
and the premium of skilled over unskilled labor. To do so, note that wages must
be equal to:



























This equation can be inverted as:
AK + B1L1 = B2L2Ã(!)
where Ã(!) = (B1!=B2)
1
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which implies:
30AK = AkB2L2(1 + Ã(!)
")
1="
Substituting this equation into the previous one, we may express B1L1 as a
function of B2L2 and !, which we may then substitute, alongside with the latter
two equations, into equation (A1.1) to get:




A.2 The labor share with labor adjustment costs (section 2.4.3)
We wish to show that the labor share is a decreasing function of the change in






Bf0(l)L ¡AC0(¢L)L + AC(¢L)
F(K;BL)
= g(k) +
AC(¢L) ¡ AC0(¢L)(L¡1 + ¢L)
F(K;B(L¡1 + ¢L))
The last term’sderivative with respectto ¢L hasthe same sign as itsnumerator:
¡AC00(¢L)F(K;BL)L¡[AC(¢L)¡AC0(¢L)L]Bf0(l). This is clearly negative if













A su¢cient condition for that to hold is AC00(¢L)L=AC0(¢L) > lf0(l)=f(l): For
AC(¢L) quadratic in ¢L this is equivalent to L=¢L > g(k); which is extremely
plausible as g(k) < 1 and ¢L is likely to be smaller than L.
A.3 Computing the wage gap from industry estimates (section 4.2)
The de…nition of a wage gap concept at the industry level is full of conceptual
problems. In addition to the fuzzyness of the concept of industry unemployment,
industry rents may generate discrepancies between the marginal product of labor in
one industry and its value elsewhere in the economy, thus contributing to a positive
wage gap in that industry regardless of the degree of slackness in the labor market.
We have dealt with this issue by computing the aggregates in equation (22) as geo-
metric averages, weighting industry-varying variables by their employment shares.
31Recalling the notation in equation (18), the precise empirical implementation of
equation (22) is as follows (suppressing country subindex j for clarity):
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where: kt = exp(
P
i eit lnkit), qt=pt = exp(ln(qt=pt)), b ¯rt =
P
ieitb ¯rit for r = 1;2,
eit = Nit=
P









Xit = (¢lnnit; ~ ¾it; f lcrt; b vit), the symbol b denotes estimates, and i = 1;:::;14.
Note that b ¯rt for r = 3;:::;5, di¤er across countries, due to the interactions with
the labor market rigidity and corporatism dummies.
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Data sources and de…nitions of variables
The variables we use in the econometric estimation are constructed from the OECD
International Sectoral Data Base (ISDB) 1996, documented in OECD (1996). It
covers the period 1960-95, but disaggregated data on a su¢cient scale for most
variables are available for 1970-93. The variables we use are as follows (original
ISDB variables denoted by their own acronyms in capital letters):
Labor share: sL = 1 ¡OP:
Capital-output ratio: k = KTV D=GDPD:
Real oil price: q=p= Nominal oil price/GDP de‡ator=(PO£ER)=(GDP=GDPV ):
Labor con‡ict rate: lcr = Number of labor con‡icts (strikes+lock-outs) /Number
of employees in the preceding year (Source: CEP-OECD Data Set, documented in
Bell and Dryden 1996).
Adjusted labor share: s¤
L = WSSS (ET=EE)=(GDP (1 ¡ IND))
where:
² OP = Ratio of gross operating surplus to value added minus net indirect taxes.
² KTV D = Gross capital stock, at 1990 prices and 1990 PPPs (US dollars).
² GDPD = Value added at market prices, at 1990 prices and 1990 PPPs. (US
dollars).
² PO = Price of oil in dollars (Source: International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics, IFS).
² ER = Exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar (Market rate/Par or Central rate, period
average. Source: IFS).
² GDP = Value added at market prices, current prices, national currency.
² GDPV = Value added at market prices, at 1990 prices, national currency.
² WSSS = Compensation of employees, at current prices, national currency.
² EE = Number of employees.
² ET = Total employment.
² IND = Ratio of net indirect taxes to value added.
The sectoral breakdown used distinguishes between 14 industries. The num-
ber of observations available for the econometric estimation by country, year, and
industry are in Table A1.
33TABLE A1
Number of Observations Available for Econometric Estimation
By Country, Year, and Industry
Country No. Year No. Year No.
United States 294 1973 69 1987 165
Canada 256 1974 119 1988 165
Japan 224 1975 119 1989 163
Germany 294 1976 119 1990 163
France 168 1977 125 1991 163
Italy 214 1978 145 1992 132
United Kingdom 121 1979 145 1993 84
Australia 102 1980 163
Netherlands 62 1981 163
Belgium 239 1982 163
Denmark 247 1983 163
Norway 247 1984 164
Sweden 260 1985 165
Finland 294 1986 165
Industry ISIC code No.
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and …shing 1 260
Mining and quarrying 2 200
Food, beverages and tobacco 31 207
Textiles, wearing apparel and leather products 32 207
Paper, paper products, printing and publishing 34 198
Chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic 35 203
Non-met. mineral products excl. petrol. and coal 36 188
Basic metal industries 37 187
Fabricated metal prods., machinery and equipment 38 207
Electricity, gas and water 4 257
Construction 5 257
Wholesale and retail trade 61+62 191
Transport, storage and communications 7 239
Community, social and personal services 9 221
Note.– Missing industries: Wood and wood products (32); Restaurants and hotels





Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables
in the Adjusted Labor Share Sample
(All observations in the sample; 1973-93)
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
deviation
Adjusted labor share 63.1 17.0 2.4 99.5
Capital-output ratio 3.7 4.2 0.4 49.1
Real price of oil 30.8 16.5 5.7 96.2
Employment growth rate -0.5 4.2 -22.3 14.9
Output volatility 2.2 1.7 0.2 32.4
Labor con‡ict rate 0.9 1.2 0.0 6.5
Note.– All variables in percentages, except the capital-output ratio and the real
price of oil. The data correspond to an unbalanced panel of 14 industries and
14 countries. Total number of observations: 2330. Source: OECD International
Sectoral Data Base (ISDB).
35TABLE A3
Estimation of Adjusted Labor Share Equation
Dependent variable: lns¤
L;ijt





Agriculture 0.16 (0.03) -0.11 (0.40)
Mining -0.56 (1.30) -0.09 (0.15)
Food -0.03 (0.23) -0.03 (0.13)
Textiles 0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.45)
Paper 0.05 (0.22) -0.00 (0.19)
Chemicals 0.32 (0.76) -0.15 (0.66)
Non-metallic minerals 0.25 (0.70) -0.08 (0.29)
Basic metal 1.06 (3.31) -0.52 (3.48)
Machinery 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.44)
Electricity, Gas & Water -0.76 (1.77) 0.29 (1.48)
Construction -0.46 (1.33) -0.03 (0.05)
Trade 0.24 (0.60) 0.01 (0.33)
Transport & Communications -0.04 (0.12) 0.01 (0.34)
Social services -0.15 (0.48) -0.02 (0.17)
Joint signi…cance (p): 109.56 (0.00) 140.44 (0.00)
Constant -0.38 (4.44)
Employment change (¢ln nijt) -0.64 (5.02)
Output volatility (e ¾ijt) -0.16 (1.23)
Labor con‡ict rate ( f lcrjt) -1.57 (2.20)
Sargan: p and d.f. 0.50 (61)
Di¤. Sargan: p and d.f. 0.18 (45)
m2 -0.86
Note.– No. of observations: 2330, no. of industry-country units: 132. Method:
Instrumental variables, system estimator. Other information as in note to Table 4.
36TABLE A4
Variants of Adjusted Labor Share Equation
Dependent variable: ln s¤
L;ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.39 -0.07 -0.46 -0.04 -0.18
(4.60) (0.82) (5.56) (0.43) (1.70)
Employment change (¢ln nijt) -0.32 -0.34 -0.56 -0.76 -0.12
(1.73) (1.87) (4.56) (2.56) (0.54)
Employment change (¢ln nijt)
£ Rigidity dummy -0.69 -1.07 -1.64 -1.50
(2.25) (3.15) (2.77) (3.25)
Output volatility (e ¾ijt) -0.20 -0.18 -0.03 -0.64 -4.08
(1.64) (0.22) (0.18) (3.06) (3.40)
Output volatility (e ¾ijt)
£ Rigidity dummy -0.02 4.76
(0.02) (3.62)
Labor con‡ict rate ( f lcrjt) -1.63 -1.29 1.41 0.56 8.24
(2.42) (1.65) (1.00) (0.42) (2.64)
Labor con‡ict rate ( f lcrjt)
£ Corporatism dummy 1 -4.80 -0.47 -12.87
(2.46) (0.26) (4.00)
Labor con‡ict rate ( f lcrjt)
£ Corporatism dummy 2 11.87 6.01 -11.16
(3.16) (1.55) (2.10)
ln kijt coe¢cients (Â2) 121.48 297.31 132.60 83.00 56.12
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ln (qjt=pjt) coe¢cients (Â2) 155.74 289.93 136.17 56.31 50.21
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sargan: p-value 0.38 0.06 0.71 0.34 0.59
Degrees of freedom 62 63 61 66 64
Di¤. Sargan: p-value 0.08 0.17 0.43 0.42 0.26
Degrees of freedom 46 47 45 49 48
m2 -0.90 0.86 -1.17 -0.92 -1.16
Note.– No. of observations: 2330, no. of industry-country units: 132. Method:
Instrumental variables, system estimator. Other information as in note to Table 4.
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Decomposition of changes in the Wage Gap (%)
A. United States
Year ¢lnnt ~ ¾t f lcrt lnh(:) g(:) ut d WGt vt WGt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1974 1.20 -0.15 -0.04 1.01 0.58 0.37 1.96 19.61 21.57
1975 1.42 -0.02 -0.17 1.23 -0.15 1.35 2.44 -8.71 -6.27
1976 -2.17 -0.06 -0.09 -2.32 0.04 -0.37 -2.65 4.14 1.49
1977 -0.09 0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.03 -0.32 -0.34 0.81 0.47
1978 -0.47 0.03 -0.12 -0.56 -0.03 -0.48 -1.07 0.44 -0.62
1979 0.59 0.11 -0.20 0.51 0.33 -0.11 0.73 11.84 12.57
1980 1.32 -0.02 -0.06 1.23 0.01 0.72 1.96 0.96 2.92
1981 -0.55 -0.01 -0.10 -0.65 -0.08 0.24 -0.49 -3.18 -3.67
1982 1.17 0.04 -0.18 1.02 -0.14 1.09 1.97 -3.61 -1.64
1983 -1.01 0.03 -0.12 -1.09 -0.13 -0.07 -1.29 -1.62 -2.91
1984 -1.56 -0.22 -0.14 -1.92 0.01 -1.05 -2.96 -0.87 -3.83
1985 1.02 0.18 -0.11 1.09 -0.04 -0.16 0.90 -3.35 -2.45
1986 0.34 0.03 -0.06 0.31 -0.43 -0.09 -0.21 -11.46 -11.67
1987 -0.40 -0.03 -0.04 -0.46 0.12 -0.38 -0.72 3.21 2.50
1988 -0.16 0.03 -0.04 -0.17 -0.13 -0.30 -0.60 -3.87 -4.47
1989 0.13 0.11 -0.01 0.22 0.07 -0.11 0.19 1.67 1.86
1990 0.64 0.01 -0.01 0.63 0.09 0.12 0.84 2.72 3.56
1991 0.62 0.05 -0.02 0.65 -0.11 0.55 1.09 -4.12 -3.03
1992 -0.47 0.09 -0.01 -0.39 -0.06 0.29 -0.16 -1.47 -1.63
1993 -0.55 0.01 -0.00 -0.54 -0.11 -0.25 -0.90 -2.51 -3.41
Note: See legenda at the bottom of panel B.
38B. Germany
Year ¢lnnt ~ ¾t f lcrt lnh(:) g(:) ut d WGt vt WGt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1974 4.36 0.05 0.02 4.43 0.26 0.53 5.23 18.23 23.45
1975 3.38 -0.11 0.13 3.40 -0.06 0.83 4.16 -6.76 -2.60
1976 -5.22 -0.07 0.01 -5.28 0.04 -0.01 -5.25 5.40 0.15
1977 -1.40 0.02 -0.01 -1.39 0.02 -0.05 -1.43 2.88 1.45
1978 -0.39 0.08 -0.03 -0.35 -0.01 -0.07 -0.43 -1.03 -1.47
1979 -1.98 0.01 -0.05 -2.01 0.23 -0.25 -2.03 17.14 15.11
1980 0.41 0.18 -0.01 0.58 0.03 -0.00 0.61 4.53 5.14
1981 3.46 0.02 0.00 3.49 -0.04 0.70 4.14 -4.83 -0.69
1982 2.27 -0.09 0.04 2.23 -0.09 1.00 3.13 -6.35 -3.22
1983 0.59 0.00 0.03 0.62 -0.10 0.74 1.27 -6.14 -4.87
1984 -3.60 0.08 0.05 -3.47 -0.01 0.01 -3.48 2.60 -0.88
1985 -1.02 -0.08 -0.03 -1.12 -0.04 0.03 -1.13 -0.60 -1.73
1986 -1.11 -0.00 -0.02 -1.14 -0.51 -0.15 -1.79 -12.31 -14.11
1987 0.99 0.10 -0.01 1.07 0.16 -0.02 1.22 3.37 4.58
1988 -0.15 -0.01 -0.03 -0.18 -0.18 -0.01 -0.37 -5.49 -5.85
1989 -1.37 -0.01 -0.01 -1.38 0.13 -0.33 -1.58 3.95 2.37
1990 -2.94 -0.02 0.02 -2.94 0.15 -0.31 -3.11 5.62 2.51
1991 0.88 -0.01 0.01 0.89 -0.11 0.20 0.98 -3.15 -2.16
1992 3.59 -0.05 0.01 3.54 -0.11 0.45 3.88 -5.15 -1.27
1993 5.13 -0.29 0.02 4.86 -0.22 0.49 5.13 -7.51 -2.37
Legenda for Table A4 (cfr. equation (22) and Appendix A.3):
(1) Contribution of changes in the employment growth rate.
(2) Contribution of changes in output volatility.
(3) Contribution of changes in the labor con‡ict rate.
(4) Contribution of labor demand shifts (=(1)+(2)+(3)): ¢lnh(Xt).
(5) Contribution of changes in g(kt;St): (' ¡1)¢(k
'
t °(St)) ut.
(6) Contribution of changes in unemployment: (1 ¡ k
'
t °(St)(1 ¡ ')) ¢ut.
(7) Changes in explained wage gap: (4)+(5)+(6).
(8) Contribution of changes in the residual.
(7) Changes in total wage gap: (7)+(8).
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41TABLE 1
The Labor Share and Real Wages in 14 OECD countries
Labor share Real wage
Levels Changes Changes
1970 1980 1990 1970-90 1970-90
United States 69.7 68.3 66.5 -3.3 0.4
Canada 66.9 62.0 64.9 -2.0 1.3
Japan 57.5 69.1 68.0 10.5 3.5
Germany 64.1 68.7 62.1 -2.0 2.0
France 67.6 71.7 62.4 -5.2 2.2
Italy 67.1 64.0 62.6 -4.5 2.1
United Kingdom 71.4 70.8 71.8 0.4 2.1
Australia 64.8 65.9 62.9 -1.9 1.2
Netherlands 68.0 69.5 59.2 -8.8 1.8
Belgium 61.6 71.6 64.0 2.4 2.9
Denmark 68.7 71.5 63.3 -5.5 1.6
Norway 68.4 66.4 63.9 -4.5 2.2
Sweden 69.7 73.6 72.6 2.9 1.6
Finland 68.6 69.6 72.3 3.7 3.5
Mean 66.7 68.8 65.5 -1.3 2.0
Standard deviation 3.5 3.1 4.0 4.7 0.8
Note.– All variables in percentages. The labor share corresponds to the business
sector, the real wage is the real compensation per employee in the private sector.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Statistics on Microcomputer Diskette.
42TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables
(All observations in the sample; 1973-93)
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
deviation
Labor share 57.2 19.7 2.4 99.0
Capital-output ratio 3.8 4.1 0.3 49.1
Real price of oil 31.0 16.2 5.7 96.2
Employment growth rate -0.5 4.4 -24.1 20.5
Output volatility 2.4 2.0 0.2 43.4
Labor con‡ict rate 0.9 1.2 0.0 6.5
Note.– All variables in percentages, except the capital-output ratio and the real
price of oil. The data correspond to an unbalanced panel of 14 industries and
14 countries. Total number of observations: 3022. Source: OECD International
Sectoral Data Base (ISDB) (Number of observations by country, year, and industry
in Table A1).
43TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics of the Labor Share
and the Capital-Output Ratio
By Industry and By Country (1973-93)
Industry sL k Country sL k sL k
ISDB ISDB Business
Sample Sample Sector
Agriculture 20.5 5.7 U. States 62.5 2.9 67.1 1.4
Mining 43.0 4.0 Canada 57.3 3.9 63.8 1.4
Food 59.7 2.2 Japan 51.6 2.8 68.8 2.1
Textiles 74.1 2.1 Germany 60.6 3.1 65.8 2.7
Paper 69.1 2.9 France 58.1 2.8 67.3 2.7
Chemicals 58.5 3.5 Italy 49.7 3.0 64.8 2.7
Non-metallic minerals 67.0 2.9 U. Kingdom 45.4 4.9 69.9 3.4
Basic metal 67.9 5.0 Australia 48.1 4.5 65.7 3.2
Machinery 74.8 1.7 Netherlands 37.1 3.3 65.2 2.3
Electricity, Gas & Water 35.7 9.7 Belgium 58.6 2.6 67.9 2.5
Construction 67.2 0.8 Denmark 61.5 4.4 66.6 4.3
Trade 64.1 1.5 Norway 56.9 6.4 65.9 4.0
Transport & Communic. 60.3 7.3 Sweden 65.6 3.6 70.5 2.5
Social services 52.8 2.2 Finland 57.4 5.2 72.0 3.6
Note.- sL: Labor share (in percentages), k: Capital-output ratio. Sources: ISDB
Sample: OECD International Sectoral Data Base (ISDB) (Number of observations
by country, year, and industry in Table A1). Business sector: OECD Economic
Outlook Statistics on Microcomputer Diskette.
44TABLE 4
Estimation of Labor Share Equation
Dependent variable: ln sL;ijt





Agriculture -1.40 (4.12) 0.29 (2.12)
Mining -0.07 (3.48) -0.19 (3.16)
Food 0.03 (4.19) -0.08 (2.67)
Textiles 0.05 (4.29) -0.02 (2.26)
Paper 0.21 (4.54) -0.06 (2.36)
Chemicals 0.39 (4.06) -0.19 (2.83)
Non-metallic minerals 0.47 (4.97) -0.18 (3.16)
Basic metal 0.99 (4.44) -0.51 (3.34)
Machinery 0.19 (4.55) -0.05 (2.41)
Elec., Gas & Water 0.04 (4.05) -0.18 (2.95)
Construction 0.14 (3.99) -0.02 (2.17)
Trade 0.46 (4.80) -0.08 (2.53)
Transport & Communic. -0.09 (3.87) -0.02 (2.16)
Social services 0.05 (4.09) -0.08 (2.58)
Joint signi…cance (p): 40.88 (0.00) 61.79 (0.00)
Constant -0.29 (2.36)
Employment change (¢ln nijt) -0.57 (4.08)
Output volatility (e ¾ijt) -0.47 (3.80)
Labor con‡ict rate ( f lcrjt) -2.29 (2.79)
Sargan: p-value and d.f. 0.10 (61)
Di¤. Sargan: p-value and d.f. 0.09 (45)
m2 -1.23
Note.– No. of observations: 3022, no. of industry-country units: 165, Period:
1973-93. Method: Instrumental variables, system estimator. Two-step estimates
of coe¢cients and t-ratios (in parenthesis) robust to residual heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation. Diagnostic statistics: p-value of the Sargan test (with degrees
of freedom beside), p-value of the Di¤erence Sargan test (with d.f. beside), and
coe¢cient of second-order correlation of the residuals. Except for the …rst one,
t-ratios on ln kijt and ln (qjt=pjt) refer to signi…cance vis-à-vis Agriculture. p-
45values of Wald test statistics of joint signi…cance of all ln kijt and ln (qjt=pjt) terms
reported next to them. Instruments. (a) Di¤erences: di ln Kij;t¡2, (ln Kij;t¡2)2,
¢ln nij;t¡2, e ¾ijt, e ¾ijt¡1, e ¾ijt¡2, di f lcrjt, and di ¢ln yj;t¡2. (b) Levels: di ¢ln kij;t¡2,
¢e ¾ijt, ¢e ¾ijt¡1, ¢e ¾ijt¡2, di ¢ f lcrjt, and di ¢2ln yj;t¡2.
46TABLE 5
Variants of the Labor Share Equation
Dependent variable: ln sL;ijt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.13 0.11 -0.39 0.02 -0.29
(1.13) (0.90) (3.02) (0.19) (2.20)
Employment change (¢ln nijt) -0.18 -0.10 -0.35 -0.31 -0.33
(0.81) (0.39) (2.16) (1.28) (2.63)
Employment change (¢ln nijt)
£ Rigidity dummy -1.09 -1.60 -1.23 -0.67
(2.68) (3.37) (2.65) (1.64)
Output volatility (e ¾ijt) -0.42 -0.40 -0.41 -0.37 -0.60
(3.32) (1.04) (3.46) (2.52) (1.65)
Output volatility (e ¾ijt)
£ Rigidity dummy 0.05 0.92
(0.05) (1.57)
Labor con‡ict rate ( f lcrjt) -3.49 -2.20 2.69 3.48 4.28
(4.17) (2.28) (1.81) (1.96) (2.26)
Labor con‡ict rate ( f lcrjt)
£ Corporatism dummy 1 -7.28 -8.37 -9.32
(3.35) (3.72) (4.22)
Labor con‡ict rate ( f lcrjt)
£ Corporatism dummy 2 8.51 1.71 3.55
(1.03) (0.28) (0.48)
ln kijt coe¢cients (Â2) 47.43 48.41 58.55 63.90 76.39
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ln (qjt=pjt) coe¢cients (Â2) 58.55 215.44 61.60 182.01 139.57
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sargan: p-value 0.15 0.15 0.24 0.13 0.14
Degrees of freedom 62 63 61 66 64
Di¤. Sargan: p-value 0.21 0.09 0.37 0.12 0.07
Degrees of freedom 46 47 45 49 48
m2 -0.83 -0.30 -1.07 -0.76 -0.83
Note.– Estimation as in Table 4. Added instruments: the dummy variables (rigid,
corp1, and corp2) whenever they appear interacted with any of the regressors.
47Figure 1. The labor share in the UK
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110Figure 7a. Wage gap decomposition, US.
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108Figure 7b. Wage gap decomposition, Germany.
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108Figure 8a. Labor demand shifts decomposition, US.
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108Figure 8b. Labor demand wage gap decomposition - Germany
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